hey facefeed, let’s just be friends

I can’t help wondering if Facebook’s acquisition of FriendFeed isn’t an overreaction by the giant social network, in response to the deafening buzz around Twitter.

It must have irked Facebook that the tech blogosphere has been obsessed this year with Twitter Twitter Twitter – Facebook’s growth has been just as impressive, arguably more so since it’s rarer to grow a large base much larger than it is to grow a small base into a medium-large base.

So in the past year, Facebook has tried to buy Twitter and has copied features of both FriendFeed and Twitter.  And this acquisition appears to be about bringing the values of FriendFeed to Facebook.  Among those values are an emphasis on product openness and sharing beyond your circle of friends.

But what if users don’t want to be more open?  Could it be that Facebook grew so fast because its users regarded the service as a safe place to share their lives with only a close circle of friends?  If Facebook becomes more like Friendfeed, will the service become less attractive to a mass audience?  (I’m certainly going to have to rethink my social media use.)  Maybe it’s only folks like the 250 that believe that everyone wants to share everything all the time.

Oh sure, Facebook has and will have a variety of privacy settings that give people choices about what to share – but these are terribly confusing and difficult to use.  More importantly, a company has to choose a single dominant brand image.  Will Facebook remain the place where friends can share their lives?  Or will it continue to morph into a knockoff of its less popular competitors?

Early indications are that Facebook will integrate FriendFeed’s staff, which is likely to lead to shuttering the FriendFeed service.  I think that could be a lost opportunity.  Facebook might do well to reaffirm its core brand as a more private place for friends, and retain FriendFeed as a brand extension that focuses on open data and public sharing.  That way they can serve the mass market and the avant garde with different product philosophies and branding.

weighing your options

A friend asks:

I’m working through a start up analysis based on a web-based software app. What is “options consistent” with a start up?

The short answer:  show the prospective employee a 5-figure number, and convince the employee that it makes sense.

The long answer:

This is highly dependent upon the type of startup and the position of the employee. I’ll answer for a typical situation of a VC-backed startup and a developer from entry-level to senior (sub-exec) level. You could have a very different answer for startup that was not VC funded, or an executive level position. You might even have a slightly different answer for non-developers, certainly in the areas of marketing, administration, customer support. (I’m putting aside for the moment the question of whether it is “right” to treat execs or different functional areas differently.)

Many propspective employees seem to take a highly illogical view of evaluating startup options. They compare the raw number to that in their other offers, or to offers that their friends received. (“Well I think I deserve at least 30,000 shares in this company, because my friend Jonny got 20,000 shares in his company, and he’s an idiot!“)

This seems nonsensical because the value of the options must be calculated with respect to the specific company situation, especially in terms of the company’s existing capitalization and prospects for liquidity and growth. Having 20,000 shares in a company that has 10 million shares outstanding is, absent other facts, five times more valuable than 20,000 shares in a company that has 50 million shares outstanding. That’s simple enough, but it is by far less important than the other main factor. Having 20,000 shares in a company that is about to go public might be much more valuable than having 20,000 shares in a company that has just started.

Might be. Or might not.  What if the company that has just started is the next Google, as they all think they are? The problem here is that you have to evaluate both distance to liquidity and prospects for growth. Figuring out which startups will be successful and when and how big they can get is extraordinarily difficult – these are things that professional money managers routinely get wrong. A prospective employee has very little hope in getting this evaluation right.

So let’s look at it from the other side: how do companies decide how many options to offer employees? Typically a company budgets a particular target of dilution from issuances of options over 12 to 18 months. For an early stage startup, this target is often around 15-20% of total capitalization (including the options pool). A one-year hiring plan in that stage might call for something like one new executive, 3 senior employees, and 12 employees from entry to mid level. So the company would budget its options accordingly, obviously also aligning grants with external market conditions.

A prospective employee who wants to know whether an offered grant is “fair” really has no better method of evaluating this than by asking the company to explain how they came up with the number. Ideally as an employee you’d want to ask:

  • What’s the fully diluted capitalization?
  • How far is the company from liquidity? What type of liquidation event does the company anticipate?
  • What are the company’s business prospects for the current year?
  • What is the options range for my position, and where am I in this range relative to other recent hires?
  • How far into the hiring plan is the company for the current year? How many and what positions will be hired?

And you ask these questions not because you can actually value the company based on the answers.  You ask as a test to see if the hiring manager has thought through the offer, and sounds as if there has been rational thought behind your compensation.  You want to work at a place where the management can provide sensible answers to these questions, independent of whether the answers can add up to a company valuation.

Many candidates do not feel comfortable asking these kinds of questions. Worse, some companies will not answer them, and will view the asking of such questions as a sign of impudence.  I’d say you should think twice about working for any company that would be insulted by the asking of these questions, but unfortunately that company attitude is not uncommon.

As a result, the best guideline to fall back upon for many prospective employees is back to good old Jonny:   What have I been offered at other companies, and what are my friends getting at their companies?

Which turns out to be not such a dumb way of evaluating offers, because many companies use more or less the same budgeting processes and have similar investor and advisor networks. So most companies end up in a similar range of options for similar positions. For most mid-to-senior positions, this will be a 5-figure number, and as long as that number can be justified to the employee, then you can move on to more important questions, such as why anyone would want to work at this company in the first place. There should be a lot of answers to that question, and the options offer should be only a very small piece of the puzzle.

virtually great currency

The acquisition of SuperRewards by Adknowledge is a notable milestone in the evolution of virtual currency business models. This is the first time an independent virtual currency platform has been acquired by a company outside of the virtual goods category, and so the first time that a virtual currency has achieved monetization for someone other than its creators and users. We’ve moved into the peak of the third phase of business models for virtual currency.

The first phase was a sort of prehistory where virtual currency was a gameplay feature of massively multiplayer online games – points that players could gain through the completion of tasks, and use to acquire in-game items that were valuable for further progress in the game. Although points have been a feature of most videogames since the inception of the medium, the relevant new thing about MMOGs was the operation of a “persistent” online economic environment. That meant that even when particular players weren’t online, the service constantly maintained an environment where items of value could be acquired and traded. Much of the trading of items for value was “off-service” – often against the game rules – but this was the first step in virtual currencies breaking free of gameplay rules.

The second phase started when online services that were not solely game-oriented used virtual currencies to encourage trading of service assets – this time trading currency for service items wasn’t against the rules, but specifically designed to encourage sales within the service. Korea’s Cyworld was a pioneer in this use, with “Cyholics” using “acorns” as a medium of exchange for digital presents that users could buy for themselves and each other. Chinese Internet portal Tencent built QQ coins into a $900 million economy, while in the U.S., Second Life users are heading towards $450 million (in U.S. Dollars) of Linden Dollar transactions. The authorized use of virtual currency within these services led naturally to implicitly or explicitly authorized use of their virtual currencies outside of the traditional boundaries of the service, demonstrated by Chinese users buying real-world items for QQ coins and Second Life users setting up 3rd-party currency exchanges and virtual goods stores. (As an illustration of the differences in culture, it’s interesting to note that the Chinese government eventually banned the use of virtual currency for “real” items, and that Linden Lab rebuilt or acquired the third party services.)

In the third phase, we have businesses that were natively built as a platform for virtual currency to be used on other services (rather than a feature of an economy within a more comprehensive service). Some have stayed closer to virtual currency’s MMOG roots, like PlaySpan and LiveGamer, while others have tried to ride the wave of social media apps platforms, like TwoFish and SocialGold. SuperRewards and OfferPal brought a new twist by using marketing offers as the underlying value to the virtual currency.

This part takes a little bit of explaining. For any currency to gain favor with a user base, there must be some underlying value to the medium of exchange – from a consumer point of view, this is sometimes expressed as a demand that the currency be “backed” by something of value. In ye olden days, governmental currency was backed by precious metal; in theory you could turn in your dollars to the government in return for equivalent value in gold. Most governmental currencies came off the gold standard decades ago, and are now backed by the declaration of the government that the currency is legal tender. The meaning of this declaration is a little murky both in theory and in practice.

Suffice to say that there are virtual currencies that emulate most of the historical models of real governmental currencies. e-Gold tried the gold-backed model, to disastrous result. Some virtual currencies are run as essentially stored value systems for governmental currency, so ultimately they are backed by the same declaration of the government. QQ coins to some extent, and Linden Dollars to a greater extent, are free-floating media of exchange that are backed by the commercial viability of their operators – a private rather than governmental declaration of value (this is not as revolutionary as it may seem, since in many ways it’s similar to airline miles and other customer loyalty programs).

By using marketing offers as the underlying value, virtual currency operators can sidestep some of the difficulties involved in demonstrating that a currency is sufficiently “backed” to satisfy customer demand for stable value. This technique introduces significant complexity and cost by introducing many additional parties to the value chain, but now SuperRewards has demonstrated (to its investors if not yet a skeptical public) that this kind of backing does create a valuable virtual currency. OfferPal is not far behind, and of course is now far ahead in terms of its ability to maintain an independent business.

So what’s coming for the fourth phase of virtual currency business models? That’ll have to be the subject of another post. But for now the developments to watch are the competition between Facebook and MySpace in their own virtual currencies, app developer currencies from companies like Zynga, and the continued progress of OfferPal.

somebody’s watching

There’s a certain techno-futurist vision of personalized advertising where constant surveillance leads to complete erosion of privacy, all in the service of targeting advertising to your behavior and tastes.  The most popular picture of this future was in the movie Minority Report, where talking ads creepily enveloped the hero in a wash of ad patter while he ran for his life.

adsthatseeyou

Despite this dystopian vision, I think the current level of public concern about the privacy invasion of targeted advertising could be described as significantly beneath swine flu and slightly above Lyme-disease bearing ticks.

But this year, the largest online advertisers and ISPs have really begun to show their power over consumer behavioral data.  The New York Times has been utterly obsessed with this topic, to the point where it’s somehow news when a company decides not to use a targeted ad system.  (I wonder if it there could really be such a thing as behavioral tracking so creepy that even advertisers won’t use it.  The cynic in me says that the system probably just didn’t work well enough to justify the cost.)

Consumers who are asked about privacy generally want greater control over their marketing data, but don’t know how they can achieve it.  In sympathy to this consumer demand, the industry’s leading ad networks have banded together to establish best practices for use of consumer data.  (This sympathy was perhaps supplemented by the interested attention of the FTC.)

Industry self-regulation is a time-honored method of appeasing and forestalling government regulation.  There are areas where this works just fine (in terms of industry commercial interest, if not art) – comics, movies and video games – this tends to involve public morality.  And there are areas where greed and the public interest seem destined to cycles of boom and bust and bust – some industries just don’t seem capable of operating without eventual crisis in a deregulated environment.

So will the ad industry’s attempt self-regulation turn out more like the entertainment industry’s successes with the morality police, or the financial industry’s pathological self-destructiveness?

On the one hand, the dynamics of targeted advertising share some characteristics with complex financial instruments:  advanced algorithms, proprietary trading systems, a leveraged financial return from a slight mathematical edge.  On the other hand, consumers are not in bed with advertisers in the way that they were with their bankers and brokers and realtors.  A little willful blindness made everyone happy for a while in finance, but that same blindness in advertising only covers growing consumer unease.

There are startups that tried to give greater consumer control over marketing data, but none really got a lot of traction.  The problem may have been that the problem wasn’t big enough yet.  Until everyone’s singing like Rockwell, it could still be too early.

advertising in 3 E-Z slides

Has the Internet ushered in a revolution in advertising, or is web advertising destined to fail?

I couldn’t begin to have an opinion without some basic context about advertising, so I gave myself a crash course.  Here’s the 3 most important things I learned:

1.  Advertising has multidimensional sectors.

Two of the fundamental axes in advertising are the lines between brand and direct response marketing, and between online and offline ads.

ad status

I can’t do the differences justice here, but essentially brand marketing is intended to make you feel a certain way about a product, while direct response is intended to make you take an immediate action regarding a product.

The concepts seem simple, but whenever new media arises, it can be quite tricky to determine what kind of advertising is suited to the media.  When the Web first burst into mass acceptance, some advertisers treated this new medium as a branding opportunity, plastering their logos and flashy campaigns wherever they could.  Google was among the first to realize that direct response principles fit the Web much better than branding – deliver ads against search results and you have a natural audience to act upon that hyperlink.

But the Web continues to evolve, giving continued opportunities to make the wrong choices about ads.  When social networks like Facebook reached mass popularity, many advertisers tried to deliver targeted direct response advertising to demographics discovered through the social graph.  But “banner blindness” and the very social intent of these sites combined to make pure direct response ads ineffective.  The better strategy for advertisers in social networks is to build a community and create engaging viral media to enhance the brand.

So the lesson here is that advertisers have to make very savvy choices between brand and direct response advertising as the evolution from offline to online continues.

2.  Online and offline ad spending patterns are currently inverted.

In the excitement about the growth of online advertising, it’s easy to forget that offline is still much bigger, with online making up roughly $23 billion of a $137 billion U.S. ad market.  These numbers are even more interesting when examined along the divide between brand and direct response.

 

According to one estimate, around 75% of offline ad dollars are spent in brand marketing, while 80% of online ad dollars are spent in direct response.  Because offline is so much bigger than online, that means that direct response offline (a.k.a. “junk mail”), makes up around $28 billion.  Yep, junk mail is bigger than the entire Internet ad industry.

Now here’s a point that’s a little more abstruse, but I hope it’s worth the time to understand it:  the advertiser’s spending pattern is inverted in online vs offline.

Offline brand advertising is expensive to create, but reaches a mass audience, so the spend per viewer is low.  Take a Super Bowl ad:  a 30-second commercial can cost $4 million (for air time and a lavish production cost), but with 95 million viewers, that’s only 4 cents per viewer.  Let’s call this low cost per viewer a mass spending pattern.

Offline direct response advertising total cost is lower, but higher per person reached.  For example, it can cost $50K to produce and mail a catalog to 10K recipients.  At $5 per person, that’s 125 times more expensive per person than a Super Bowl ad!  But it works because of the targeting – those 10K people have been identified by the advertiser as being likely to be interested in the product.  This low threshold, high cost per viewer is a targeted spending pattern.

The patterns are rewired online.  Search advertising and email campaigns are direct response in that there is a clear desired action (usually a click).  Though the cost of the keyword or email campaign can be relatively low, the distribution is very broad, so the cost per viewer is extremely low –  this is a mass spending pattern.

Conversely, doing effective brand advertising on a social network requires really identifying the target demographic and crafting a creative campaign to get that ballyhooed viral explosion.  That means relatively high creation cost and a specific audience, resulting in a high cost per viewer – this is targeted spending.

So offline, brand advertising is mass spending while direct response is targeted spending.  And online, brand advertising is targeted spending while direct response is mass spending. Or at least, that’s the way it is today . . .

3.  Successful advertising tactics will seek equilibrium.

Pundits are always rushing to declare failure, or any new method the death of all old ones.  But offline advertising feeds online, and online direct response may morph into “brand response.”  Advertising, like nature, restlessly searches for equilibrium.  The story above is heading towards a more stable balance so the value of the spending better matches the returns.

ad future

It’s not controversial to suggest that offline ad dollars will move online – that’s more an observation than a suggestion at this point.  And it’s also been an observable trend that offline direct response marketing is declining at an even faster rate than offline brand marketing, because Internet direct response has rapidly become effective for larger audiences.  But I’m adding two conjectures that aren’t easily observable today.

First, online brand marketing will grow at a faster rate than online direct response.  This means that social media like Facebook and Twitter (like them, not necessarily those two) will grow revenues faster than Google.

Second, online brand spending will revert back to the offline spending pattern of mass rather than targeted, and online direct response will similarly go to targeted spending rather than mass.  I believe that dominant social media sites and practices will arise that allow brand advertisers to reach a large audience at a low cost per viewer.  At the same time, increasingly effective data collection on Internet consumers will allow data holders to sell highly targeted direct response ads at premium prices per consumer.

What does it take to get from here to equilibrium?  In monetary terms, holding the total ad industry constant at $140 billion (not a safe assumption):

  • $50 billion will move from offline to online
  • $15 billion will move from offline direct response to online direct response
  • Online direct response will grow by $20 billion, while the revenue per viewer seeks a relatively high number
  • Online brand marketing will grow by $30 billion, while the revenue per viewer seeks a relatively low number

That is a lot of money sloshing around, in a lot of different directions.  I think it’ll happen within 5 years.

best startup blogs for entrepreneurs

I once made a case for pmarca as the best startup blogger evah.  Now that I’m in the midst of my own entrepreneurial efforts, I’ve had plenty of occasion to revisit the category.

I still think no one matches Marc for the sophistication and deep experience of his posts.  But I think that once you have the background that he covers, if you are working on a startup you might want something that gives you more guidance about what you are facing day to day.  So here are a few possibilities for interested entrepreneurs:

ReadWriteWeb is running a serialized book called Startup 101 that describes the startup life cycle.  It has a number of factors against it:  the information is very broad and basic, it’s directed only at web startups, it assumes little to no experience in business generally.  Nevertheless it looks to be shaping up as a nice basic primer for first-time startup folks.

Venture Hacks has some good info, mostly about fundraising but also assorted other categories.  This is possibly the best resource for those who are mystified about how VCs think.

Eric Ries has made a name for himself around the catchphrase “The Lean Startup” – a solid summary of fundamental principles of running a low-burn, nimble business.  Much of this might seem fairly obvious to folks who have worked in modern web startups, but Eric has a really nice clean delivery of the concepts.

Steve Blank has shared the stage with Eric for “Lean Startup” presentations, so the two have a common mindset.  Steve differentiates himself with a much longer history of entrepreneurialism, which gives him great authority and many informative war stories to share.  His customer development model is highly valuable to any startup (though a bit better oriented to enterprise customers than mass consumers).

Steve’s blog has risen to another level in recent posts about how entrepreneurs can stop lying to themselves and deserve an epitaph that signify a family life well lived.  I haven’t seen any other startup blogger come closer to giving this topic the time and attention it deserves – managing the demands of a startup in balance with a rich family life is incredibly difficult.  Perhaps too few have succeeded in this to inspire many good blogs about it.

Finally, probably my favorite category of startup blog is from those who are blogging the process while they’re doing it.  Signal vs. Noise is a classic in this category, but I like to find new blogs from relatively unknown startups.  Two that I happened across recently are from the founders of Expensify and Alice.

What are your favorite startup blogs?  I’m particularly interested in finding ones from startup founders who are blogging it while they’re doing it.

entrepreneurial lobbying

Warning:  this post is very long and concerns tax policy, and so is likely to suck your soul while you read.  However, if you have been or ever will be a highly successful entrepreneur, then I’m talking about matters that mean millions of dollars to you.  Enjoy.

We are in a time when the government’s hand in the U.S. economy is heavier than at any time since as least as far back the 1930’s.  Makes me wonder who, if anyone, lobbies in D.C. for the benefit of entrepreneurial activity?

The National Venture Capital Association has been in the news of late, as it tries to avoid Congressional and Treasury proposals to regulate “private pools of capital” – a generic term that includes hedge funds as well as venture capital funds.  Hedge fund activity in the credit markets may have contributed to the systemic failures in the financial system, but commentators indignantly proclaim that venture capital had nothing to do with the current mess.

The NVCA is the main lobbying organization of the venture capital industry, and in their stated mission and nearly all of their public policy positions, they say they have a broader mandate to “support entrepreneurial activity and innovation.”  The NVCA wants Washington to understand the VCs are not merely investors, but part of the lifeblood of the entrepreneurialism that fuels massive portions of the U.S. and world economy.

I suspect that at first the fine folks at the NVCA made this connection to entrepreneurialism because it sounds worthy and friendly to politicians, as compared to being cast as mere financial speculators.  But now this connection has become a key conceptual anchor of their argument that venture capital should be treated differently from hedge funds and other private equity funds.  Those other guys are pointy-headed number crunchers, see, who move massive amounts of money and credit with extreme disregard for our financial system.  VCs are closely involved with startup innovation, heck they are practically entrepreneurs themselves!

This conflation of VCs with entrepreneurs is even more critical in what has become the most important lobbying battle in the history of the NVCA, the fight over carried interest tax policy.  I think if more entrepreneurs understood this particular public policy issue, there might someday be better lobbying in DC for related issues that are closer to the hearts and wallets of entrepreneurs.

Briefly, VCs are typically compensated in two ways, with management fees and carried interest.  Management fees are a small percentage of the total capital commitment of the fund.  For example, a $100 million fund might have a 2% management fee, so the VCs receive $2 million per year for their operating expenses.  Carried interest is basically profit sharing on the investment.  So for example, if the $100 million fund operates for 10 years, and makes $500 million, a 20% carried interest might be applied on the profit – that would be $500 million less the $100 million of invested capital, less the $20 million of management fees (assuming 2% per year).  So 20% of $380 million is $76 million.  I’ve smoothed over a lot of variations and complexities, but this is basically how it works.

And how the U.S. tax system works – smoothing over a thousand times more variations and complexities – is that you either pay ordinary income tax of 35%, or long term capital gains tax of 15%.  Have you guessed what the carried interest tax policy battle is about?  That’s right:  carried interest has historically been taxed as capital gain, but many are now calling for it to be taxed as ordinary income.  In the example above (which would not be a particularly large or extraordinarily successful fund), the 20% difference in tax rates would mean $15.2 million less for the fund managers.  You can see why this is the Battle of the Century for the NVCA.

Now, let’s get back to this point about VCs being practically entreprenuers themselves.  In Congressional testimony, the NVCA says that venture capitalists rise above mere “financial engineers” (presumably the hedge funds and private equity guys), contributing sometimes daily management attention and real “sweat equity” into startup companies.  Some entrepreneurs may snicker at that testimony, and others may pluck their eyeballs out rather than read it.  I can freely admit that I’ve seen VCs who do make invaluable contributions to their portfolio companies, far above merely providing money.

But if the NVCA really wants entrepreneurs to view their efforts to “support entrepreneurial activity” favorably, they ought to extend their views on tax policy to the issues that really and directly affect entrepreneurs.  See, although startup founders can readily enjoy capital gains treatment on the value of their equity, some bizarre tax policies in this country often have the practical effect of forcing ordinary income treatment on the equity stakes of many private company employees.  The NVCA is fighting tooth and nail so that VCs (who are almost like entrepreneurs, after all) can get capital gains tax treatment, while saying not a single word about the policies that cause millions of startup employees to have their equity gains treated as ordinary income.

There are many ways that the NVCA could advocate tax policy for the benefit of entrepreneurs, but I’ll note the two most obvious ones, one a layup and the other a long ball in difficulty of change:

The layup is the Section 83(b) issue.  This is just an utterly bizarre policy that is harmless to entrepreneurs if you file all your paperwork correctly, but it is ruinous to entrepreneurs (and often their companies and lawyers) when there is a mistake in filing.  Briefly, founders and very early employees of startups usually receive stock (not options, but the stock itself) that is subject to vesting.  The tax code says that ordinary income tax is due as the stock vests, on the spread between the price paid for the stock and the value on the date of vesting.

That’s a real problem, because even as the stock vests, it has no liquid market – meaning that the stock can’t be sold easily.  So an entrepreneur who holds this stock in a successful company would get huge tax bills that he or she cannot pay.  Fortunately, the IRS allows the stockholder to make a “Section 83(b) election” – this is an election to pay the tax at the time of the initial stock purchase.  Since typically the price paid for the stock is the fair market value of the stock at the time of purchase, there is no spread and therefore no tax is due.

So that would be harmless, except that if you don’t file the election in the right way at the right time (30 days after purchase), you have to pay taxes the default way.  And that kind of mistake does happen, and it can cost millions – not just for the taxpayer, because ruinous tax issues for company founders and early employees can easily sink the company itself, and also typically results in malpractice suits against the company lawyers.

Why should the default position in the tax law be to pay a ruinous tax that no rational person would ever voluntarily elect to pay?  Why not just have a law that says if I don’t do a cartwheel on my lawn every 30 days, then I have to give my house to the IRS?  This is just utterly inane, so inane that it should be an easy win for the NVCA if they were to take it up as a lobbying cause.

The long ball would be for the NVCA to go after AMT/ISO reform.  This is a very complicated issue, but bear with me, because this problem does routinely affect startup company employees.  In a vast, vast oversimplication:  the problem is that the Alternative Minimum Tax requires Incentive Stock Option holders to pay a tax on exercise of their options, even though the company is private and there is no liquid market for their shares.

In a successful company, this can mean a tax vastly exceeding the assets of the employee, with no means of paying it.  A typical solution for many is to sell their shares at the mercy of the less liquid secondary markets (at severe discounts), in order to be able to pay the taxes.  And of course, a sale in that situation is typically taxed at ordinary income rates rather than capital gains rates, because of ISO tax rules.  So AMT and ISO rules conspire to mean that startup employees often are forced to sell their stock at discount values, and to add insult to injury the gain is taxed as ordinary income rather than capital gain.

So, NVCA:  you need to go after those two issues before any knowledgable person should regard you as an advocate for entrepreneurs and innovation.  Not only would you get the cosmic satisfaction of your actions actually conforming with your words, but you would also likely get grateful contributions from entrepreneurs and their lawyers.

faith and reason and startups

Faith is often mischaracterized as the opposite of reason, a belief held outside of rationality. But irrational belief is not faith, it’s just simpleminded credulity. And those who have no reasons other than reason are no less simple.

Faith and reason, properly understood, are intertwined sources of truth. The encyclical Fides et Ratio states this more elegantly:

Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth

In this light, I contemplated Fred Wilson’s note about investing on faith. The implication for some may be that this is investing without reason. However, Wilson’s leap of faith is no less legitimate than “pure” reason. Unlike religion, truth for startups has an ultimate arbiter in this plane of existence: return on investment. There are legions of startups that had all the reasons in the world to succeed – great idea, huge market, killer team – and yet they failed nonetheless. I’d bet that experienced startup investors have succeeded as many times on what Wilson calls faith as they have by stacking up reasons.

Coincidentally, the next day, Steve Blank posted on the startup transition from faith to facts. It might seem hard to argue with his view that startups begin on faith and must quickly move to facts to succeed. Again, I wouldn’t draw the divide that sharply. I’d say faith is a requirement throughout the journey, and so are facts. From day one, you must believe in what you’re doing, have faith informed by reason. And also from day one, you must engage with the facts; endlessly and relentlessly collect, examine and act on available facts with all your reason supported by your faith.

social media cheat sheet

I tweeted a friend’s WSJ post, and he asked me why the update didn’t show up on my Facebook status.  Damn, I was afraid someone would ask me that someday.  The reason is that I use extremely precise and entirely idiosyncratic rules for how I publish personal social media.  Here is a cheat sheet:

social site receives from publishes to primary purpose
Facebook FriendFeed no external publishing for both personal and professional contacts to get mostly personal updates from me
Twitter no external sources FriendFeed for me to broadcast updates to contacts as well as strangers
ginsudo blog Flickr FriendFeed, LinkedIn open publication of longer form pieces, often for blatant self-promotion
LinkedIn ginsudo blog no external publishing distributes professional info only, to professional contacts only
Flickr no external sources Facebook, FriendFeed, ginsudo blog photo sharing for contacts and strangers
FriendFeed Twitter, Flickr, ginsudo blog Facebook (thru FF app) for social media junkies to get as much public me as there is, without much personal detail
Google profile no external sources open publication in case someone Googling me searches for “gene yoon” instead of “ginsu yoon”
Picasa Picasa desktop private links only photo sharing for family and friends
private blog no external sources no open publication therapy notes, homemade platitudes, risqué pictures, cartoons, country music lyrics

To the untrained eye, this may seem somewhat insane – that’s ridiculous, it’s completely insane.

madness, I say, it's madness!

Updated 29 Apr 2010: Finally decided what I wanted to do since Facebook acquired FriendFeed.  Going to hook up blog, Flickr and Twitter directly to Facebook, disconnect FriendFeed app from Facebook.  This means that the things that I previously shared to siloed audiences, I now share to all audiences, and I share them through Facebook as a central sharing point.  Which of course, is exactly what Facebook wanted from the FriendFeed acquisition.

a pleasant significance

p. 58:

He smiled – and suddenly there seemed to be a pleasant significance in having been among the last to go, as if he had desired it so all the time.

Have you ever met someone with this degree of charisma?  You’d know it if you had.  The magnetic pull that a person like this can exert upon you is mesmerizing, lulling you into a warm fuzz of contentment, willing you to believe whatever is in the moment.  This is much more subtle than the shock and awe of a motivational speaker for desperate losers; it’s a slow, singular seduction from which no one can claim full immunity.  It’s more pleasant than powerful and therefore less resistable.